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continued fro m page 13 
appea rs these changes were consistent with the purpose of the Act, and that if 
futu re changes were to deviate from the purpose fo r wh ich a monument was 
designated , the ana lysis becomes simila r to a revocation- it would require an 
Act of Cong ress. See ROBERT ROSENBAUM ET AL., TH E PRESIDENT HAS No POWER 
UN ILATERALLY TO A BOLISH A NATIONAL MONUMENT UNDER TH E A NTIQU ITIES ACT 
OF 1906 (A rno ld and Porter Kaye Scholar, 20 17) (sta ling tha t in small cases, 
Pres ide nt s have modified monument boundaries). 
38 See VI NCENT, supra note 27 (stating that Cong ress has conve rted certai n 
monuments into protecti ve designations, such as national pa rk s). 
39 See Mark Sq uill ace, The Monumenral Legacy oflhe Anliqu i1ies Ac/ of 
1906, 37 GA. L. REv. 473, 550 (2003) (re feren cing ongress iona l power to 
rever e pres identi a l dec isions establi shing nationa l monuments). 
40 Review of Desig nations Under the Antiquit ies Act , 82 Fed. Reg. 20,429, 
20,429 (May I, 20 17). 
41 See id. (tasking the Secretary to balance the or ig inal obj ect ives of the 
Antiquities Act with the protection of landmarks, structures, and other 
objec ts). 
42 See Stephan ie Regeno ld , Monumen/al or No l: Presidenlial Aulhority 
Under 1he Anliquiries Ac/ of 1906, The FED. LAW. 25, 28 (Jun e 20 18). 
43 See id. al 28-29 (summari zing the Department of Interior's process fo r 
stud y ing and considering public comment rega rding possible modifications to 
monuments). 
44 id. al 29- 30 (citing Secretary Z inke's Memora ndum to the Pres ident : 
Final Report Summari z ing Findings of the Review o f Desig nations Unde r the 
Ant iquities Act). 
45 Modifying the Bears Ears Nationa l Monument, Proc. 968 1 (Dec. 4, 20 17), 
82 Fed. Reg. 58,08 1, 58,085 ( Dec. 8, 20 17). 
46 Modify ing the Grand Staircase-Esca lante ati onal Monument, Proc . 
9682 (Dec. 4, 20 17), 82 Fed. Reg. 58,089, 58,089 ( Dec. 8, 20 17). 
47 See Hopi Tribe v. Trump, Case No. I :17-cv-02590-TSC (D.D.C. Dec. 4 , 20 17). 
48 See Mod ify ing the Bears Ears Nationa l Monument, supra note 45, at 
58,085; Modify ing the Grand Staircase-Escalante Nationa l Monument, supra 
note 46, at 58,093. 
49 See, e.g., Remarks by Pres iden t Trump at Sig ning of Executive Order on 
the Antiquit ies Act (A pr. 26, 2018) https://www.w hitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/ remarks-pres ident-trump-s ig n ing-executi ve-orde r-antiquities-act/ 
(decla ring that "[t]oday, I am signi ng a new executive order to end another 
egregious abuse of federa l power, and to g ive that power back to the states 
and to the people, where it belongs" ). 
50 43 U.S.C. § 133J (a) (20 12). 
51 Id. at § 133J(b)- (c) . 
52 Id. at § 1341(a) ("The President of the Un ited States may, from time to 
time, withdraw from di sposition any of the unleased lands of the outer Conti -
nenta l Shelf."). 
53 Briefer on Presidenlial Wilhdrawal Under OCSLA Sec. 12(a), NAT. R ES . 
DEF. COUNCIL (2016), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/defau ltlfi Jes/ briefer-on-
ocs la-withdrawa l-autho rity _ 20161121 _0.pdf [hereinafter NATURAL RESOURCES 
DEFENSE COUNCIL]. 
54 See id. (re ferring to Pres ident 's power to bar di spos ition of la nd or titl es 
under federa l marine waters). 
55 54 U.S.C. § 32030 J(a)- (b). 
56 NAT. RE . DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 2. 
57 Id. al i (providing a chrono logy of withd rawals under §12(a), but not 
including Pres ident Obama's December 20, 20 16, withdrawa l of nearly 11 5 
million ac res of the Arctic Ocean and 3.8 million acres off the At lantic coa st; 
ea rli er in the year, Pres ident Obama excluded those areas fo r a five-year 
period , making the exclusion permanent fo llow ing the results o f the Novem-
ber election and before Pres ident-e lec t Trump took o ffice). 
58 See Leag ue of Conse rvation Voters v. Dona ld Trump, No. 3:1 7-cv-
00 10 1-SLG, 2019 WL 143 1217, *5 ( D. A laska, Mar. 29, 2019) ("The text of Sec-
tion 12(a) refers only to the w ithd rawal of lands; it does not expressly au thori ze 
the President to revoke a prior withdrawal. Cong re s appea rs to have expressed 
o ne concept - withd rawa l - and excluded the converse - revocation."). 
59 Section 12(a) does say the President " may, from time to time, withdraw 
from di spos ition any of the unleased land of the o ute r Continental Shelf." 
43 U.S .C. § 134 1(a). 
60 In 1990, President George H.W. Bu sh issued a presidenti a l directive 
order ing the Inte rior Department not to conduct offshore leasing or preleas ing 
Spring 2019 
activ ity in places other than Texas, Loui s iana , Alabama, and parts of Alaska 
until 2000- prohibiting leas ing in the same areas covered by the a nnua l 
mo ratoria enacted by Cong ress th rough the Interior appropri atio ns process . 
Pres ident C linton extended the tempora ry offshore leas ing prohibitio n until 
20 12, while pe rmanent ly withdrawing areas des ignated as marine sanctuar-
ies. Then , in 2008, Pres ident George W. Bush revo ked the tim e- limited 
wi thdrawal but left in place Pres ide nt C linton's permanent withdrawal 
compri sing approximate ly 10.8 million ac res o f marine sanc tuary. See Bu sh, 
G.W. Memora ndum on Modification o f the Withdrawal of Areas of the United 
States Outer Cont inenta l She lf from Leas ing Di spos ition, 44 Weekl y Comp. 
Pres . Docs. 986 (Jul y 14, 2008). 
61 AT. RES . DEF. COUNCIL , supra note 53, at 2. Note that the permanent 
withd rawa l is des ignated " for a time period without specific ex piration ," 
lang uage which Pres ident Obama used in hi s most recent withdrawal s under 
OCSLA . ld. 
62 Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Stra tegy, Exec. Order 
No. 13795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,8 15, 20,815 (A pr. 28, 20 17) [hereinafter Imple-
menting an America-First Offsho re Energy Strategy]. 
63 Id. at 20,8 16. 
64 Northern Bering Sea C limate Res ilience, Exec. Order o. 13754, 8 1 Fed. 
Reg. 90,669, 90,669 (Dec. 9, 20 16) (discuss ing in Section 3 the withdrawal 
" from di spos ition by leas ing fo r a time period without spec ific expirat ion 
the following areas of the Outer Conti nenta l Shelf: ((1 ) Norton Basin Plan-
ning Area ; and (2) St. Matthew-Hall Planning Area]. The . .. withdrawal 
prevents consideration of these a reas for future o il or gas leas ing for purposes 
of exploration, development, or production. This withdrawal furth ers the 
principles of responsible public stewardship entrusted to thi s office and takes 
due conside ration of the importance of the w ithdrawn area to A laska Nat ive 
tribes, wildlife, and wild li fe habitat, and the need for reg iona l resiliency in 
the face of c limate change. Nothing in this withdrawal affects ri g hts under 
existi ng leases in the withdrawn areas."). 
65 Implement ing an Amer ica-First Offshore Energy Strategy, supra note 62 , 
at 20,8 16, Section 4(c) . 
66 These we re presidentia l memoranda effecting " Withdrawa l of Certa in 
Areas of the United States Outer Continental Shelf from Leas ing Dispos itio n" 
issued on December 20, 20 16, January 27, 2015, and Jul y 14, 2008. It appea rs 
that the Trump Order leaves in place a memorandum of December 16, 20 14 
withdrawing the North A le utian Basin Planning Area , including Bristol Bay, 
o ffshore A laska. 
67 Implementi ng an America-First Offshore Ene rgy Strategy, supra no te 
62, § 5. Presumably, the Ad ministra ti on wanted to avoid cha llenge unde r the 
Marine Protection, Research , and Sanc tua ries Act, which requires specific 
procedures and findings of the Secretary of Commerce before a marine sanc-
tuary designation could be wi thdraw n. See 16 U.S.C. § 1434 (20 12). 
68 See League ofConservalion Vorers v. Donald Trump, 303 F. Supp. 3d 
985 (D. Alaska, 20 18) (ci ting Memora ndum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment asserting that Pres ident Trump's withdrawa ls under 
OCSLA exceed presidential powers. 
69 League of Conserva tion Voters v. Dona ld Trump, o. 3: I 7-cv-00101-SLG, 
20 19 WL 1431217, *16 (D. Alaska, Mar. 29, 20 19). 
70 Id. at 30. 
71 Congress can a lso stipulate that the President use one or another of these 
instruments for a particular purpose. See KENNETH MAYE R, WITH TH E STROKE 
OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE O RDERS AN D PR ESIDENTI AL POWER 58 (200 1). 
72 16 u.s.c. §§ 431 - 433; 43 u.s.c. §§ 1331- 1356. 
73 For in sta nce, both proc lamations and executi ve o rders have been used 
to create forest reserves. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE: FOREST 
SERVICE, ESTABLISHMENT AND MODIFICATION OF N ATIONAL FOREST BOUNDA R-
IES - A CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD 189 1- 1973 (20 12). President Obama declared 
and withdrew land for monuments throug h pres idential procl a mation , even 
tho ug h prior Pres idents sty led the withdrawals as executive o rde rs . Maybe 
te lling is that Obama's most recent Proc la ma tions of nationa l m o numents 
were wide ly reported in the medi a as "executive o rders." Mea nwhile, to 
withdraw areas of the outer continenta l she lf under hi s O CS LA authority, 
Obama issued pres idential memoranda. The Obama WhiteHou se.gov delin -
ea ted " Pres identia l Act ions" as, sepa ratel y, Execut ive Orde rs, Pres idential 
Memoranda , and Proclamations. See Presidential Ac/ions, TH E WHIT E HousE, 
h ttps://oba ma wh itehouse.a rch i ves .gov/ briefi ng-room/presiden tia I-act io ns. 
27 
74 M a ry Wood wa rd, Executive Orders: A Journey, 10 LEGAL REFERE CE 
SERV ICES Q. 125, 126 (1990) (expla ining that ne ither the Constitution nor any 
sta tute de fines an executi ve order). 
75 See COMM. 0 Gov'T O PERATIONS, EX ECUTIVE ORDERS AND PROCLAMATIONS: 
A STUDY OF A USE OF P RESIDENTIAL POWERS v ii ( 1957) (observ ing that that 
procla m a tions primaril y a ffect the activities of private indiv idua ls, while 
executi ve o rde rs usuall y affect private offic ia ls o nl y indirectl y). The authors 
of the s tud y reasoned that, "s ince the Pres ident has no power or autho rity over 
indiv idu a l c iti zens and the ir rights exce pt whe re he is g ranted such power and 
autho rity by a prov is ion in the Constitution or by statute, the Pres ide nt 's proc -
lam a tio ns are not legally binding and a re at best hortato ry unless based on 
such grants of authority." Id. Subsequent accounts suggest that Pres idents "a re 
mo re apt to utili ze executi ve orders o n matters tha t may benefi t fro m public 
awareness o r be subject to heightened scrutiny," w hile Memoranda ty pica lly 
ca rry o ut mo re ro utine executive dec is ions, or to " pe r fo rm duti es con s istent 
w ith the law or implement laws that a re pres ident ia l priorities." V1v1A S. CH U 
AND TODD GARV EY, EXECUTIVE ORDERS: ISSUANCE, M ODIFICATION AND R EVOCA-
TION 3 (2014). Proclamatio ns seem to va ry w idely from mere ly dec la ratory 
in e ffect to those w ith substantive impact. See LOU IS FISHER, TH E LAW OF THE 
EXECUTIVE BRA NCH, PR ESIDENTIAL POWER 103 (S te phen M . Sheppard, 20 14). 
76 See generally M AYER, supra note 7 1, at 58 . 
77 i d. a t 58- 59 (c iting COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, EXECUTIVE O RDERS AND 
PROCLAMATIONS: A STUDY OF A USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 4- 5 (1957)) . 
78 C HU & GARVEY, supra note 75, at 2. 
79 See Today in History - November 26, LIBRARY OF CONG., https://w w w. loc. 
gov/ item / today-in-hi sto ry/november-26/ (las t v is ited Ma r. 28, 20 19) (ch roni -
c ling the hi sto r y o f the Thanksgiv ing Proclamatio n) [he re ina fte r Today in 
His tory - November 26}. 
80 The "vesting c lauses" of the .S. Constitution confe r three di scre te ty pes 
o f a utho rity on three branches, witho ut an explic it requirement of sepa ratio n 
o f powers o r checks and ba lances. A rt. I § I reads "[a] ll legi slati ve Powers 
here in gra nted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, w hich sha ll 
cons ist o f a Senate a nd Ho use of Representatives . See U.S. CONST. a rt. I § I. 
A rti c le I I § 1 reads "The executive Power sha ll be vested in a Pres ident of the 
United States of A merica ." Id. 
81 Implem enting an A meri ca-First Offshore Ene rgy Strategy, supra note 62, 
at§ 2. 
82 T ho ug h these a rg uments have been made, they a re no longer at issue. See 
Getches, supra no te 20, at note 46. 
83 C HU & G ARVEY, supra note 75, at 7. 
84 The Mexico City Policy: An Explainer, KAISER FAM ILY FOUND. 
(Ja n . 28, 201 9), https://www.kff.o rg/g lo ba l-hea lth-policy/ fact-sheet/ 
mex ico-c ity-po l icy-expla ine r/. 
85 CHU & GARVEY, supra note 75, at 7 (chronic ling a long line of substanti ve 
cha nges to Executi ve overs ig ht th roug h issuance, modification and revocat io n 
of executive o rde rs). 
86 See Today in History - November 26, supra no te 74 . 
87 Yoo & GANZ IANO, supra note 33, at 7 (emphasis added). 
88 Id. a t 8 (expla ining, fo r example , that the Constitution desc ribes no pro -
cess fo r re pea ling a statute) . 
89 Id. 
90 i d. a t 9. 
91 See Gorbach v. Reno, 2 19 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Ci r. 2000) (en bane) ("We 
m ust dec ide w he ther the powerto con fe r c it izenshi p thro ug h the p rocess of 
naturali za tion necessaril y inc ludes the power to revoke that c iti zenship . We 
conc lude th at it does not ."). 
92 See id. a t 1090, 1095. 
93 See id. at 109 1, I 095 . 
94 See id. at I 095. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 See Yoo & GANZIANO, supra note 33, at 5-9. 
98 For insta nce, Yoo and Ganziano c ite that the Pres ident can unil a tera ll y 
undo an appo intme nt witho ut the ena te 's ap prova l, even tho ugh thi s negates 
the ea rli e r Sena te confirmatio n of the a ppointee. Id. at 9 (citing Myers v. 
United S ta tes, 272 U.S. 52 ( 1926)). A plu ra lity of the Supreme Court a lso 
a llows the Pres ident to unil a terally te rminate a treaty even tho ugh the treaty 
required the advice and consent of the Senate to be fo rmed . Id. (c iting G old-
wa te r v. Carte r, 6 17 F.2d 697 (D.C. C ir. 1979) (vacated by G oldwater v. Carter, 
444 U.S. 996 ( 1979)); Kucinich v. Bush , 236 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002)). 
99 Gorbach , 2 19 F.3d at 1095. 
28 
100 Yoo & GA NZ IA NO, supra note 33, al 7 (c iting Pennsylva nia v. Lynn , 50 1 
F.2d 848, 855-56 ( D.C. C ir. 1974)). 
101 Id. Yoo & GA ZIANO, supra note 33, at 9 (citing INS v. Chadha , 462 U.S. 
9 19 ( 1983)). 
102 Rev iew of Des ig nations Under the A ntiquiti es Act, 82 Fed. Reg. at 20,429 
(A pr. 26, 201 7). 
103 Congress can influence o r even la rge ly block nationa l monument 
im plementation th ro ug h fu nding restrict ions. The fac t that it fun ds monu-
ments, even controve rs ia l ones, suggests it has ratified the withdrawa ls. A 
ratifi cation-through-appropri ation theory might strengthen over time, with 
subsequent appropriatio ns. The a rg ument would a lso not ho ld fo r the most 
recent withdrawals, such as Bea rs Ears, which has not existed during an 
appropriations cyc le. 
104 16 U.S.C. § I (201 2) (directing management of the nationa l pa rks " to con-
serve the scenery and the natu ra l and hi storic objects and the wildlife therein 
and to prov ide fo r the e njoyment of the same in such manner and by such means 
as w ill leave them uni mpai red for the enjoyment of future generations." ). 
105 See ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 37, at 13 (citing 54 USC§§ 100102(2), 
10050 1 (20 12)) (de finin g "Natio na l Pa rk System" to include any a rea adminis-
tered by the ational Pa rk Serv ice, inc luding for " monument" purposes). 
106 See 36 C.F. R. § 1.2 (Nat iona l Pa rk Serv ice regulatio ns apply to federal ly 
owned land admi n iste red by N PS); see generally 36 C.F.R . § 7. The Inter ior 
De pa rtment regu latio ns fo r pa rks and monuments va ry wide ly; some a re 
ex tensive management plans, others a re re lative ly short or nonex istent for 
spec ific pa rks or monuments. There is an a rg ument that revoki ng a na tional 
monument would a lso effecti vely resc ind any a pplicable regulation o r man-
age ment plan , requiring some process unde r the Admini strati ve Procedure 
Act. It would de pend o n the process used in implementing the regu lation 
in the fir st place, whether th rough noti ce and com ment rul emaking o r the 
agency fo und good cause to wa ive noti ce and comment because the reg ula-
tio ns "don ' t ex pand on the action a lready taken by the President." Id. 
'°7 See ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 37, at 13. 
108 54 U. S.C . § l001 0 1(b)(12). 
109 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 , 372 (1989) (c iting J. W. 
Hampton , Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 ( 1928)). 
110 See generally Whi tman v. A m. Trucking Ass' n, Inc., 53 1 U.S. 457 (200 1) 
(exa mining whether the C lean A ir Act had impermissibly de legated legisla-
t ive power to the Env iro nmenta l P rotection Agency). 
111 See infra Part ll (A). 
11 2 Proposed Abolishment of Castle Pinckney N ational Monument, 39 Op. 
Att 'y. Gen. 185, 186 ( 1938) [he re inafte r Pinckney}. 
11 3 See id. al 187. 
114 See id. at 186- 187 (" [J] f public lands a re reserved by the Pres ident for a 
particular purpose unde r express autho rity of an act of Cong ress, the Pres i-
dent is the reafte r without autho rit y to abo li sh such reservation."). 
11 5 See Castle Pinckney Uses, NAT' L PARK SERv., https ://w ww.nps.gov/fos u/ 
lea rn /h istoryc u lture/castle -pi nckney-use. htm ( last visited Apr. I 0, 20 19). 
116 See Pinckney, supra note 11 2, at 186. The justificatio n fo r aboli shing 
the monument was that the fo rt was in need ofre pa ir, tha t the public had not 
" manifested any g reat interest in it as an object of hi stori ca l importa nce," and 
that the expense of resto ring the fo rt fo r "future preservat ion" was unjust ified. 
Id. Furthe rmore, the War Depa rtment was a lread y using the land fo r s torage 
purposes and wanted to con tinue do ing so. Id. 
11 7 See id. at 189. 
118 i d. at 188 (c iting Rock Is land M ilitary Reser vation, JO O p. Att 'y Gen. 359, 
364 ( 1862)). 
119 See Rock Island Milita ry Reservation, 10 Op. Att 'y Gen. 359, 36 1- 62 
( 1862) ("This view of the Executive authority in the premi ses seems to me 
to accord so exact ly w ith the pla in and well-acce pted theory of the di v is ion 
of powers in our Government. ... The appropria tion of the public do main , 
e ithe r to public or private use, is eminently an ac t of sovere ig n powe r. It is 
the exerci se o f ownership and implies the rig ht of control ove r the titl e . It is 
a conversion of the property of the nation equa l in respons ibility and grav ity 
wi th the a ppropria tion of the publ ic money and de rives its authority from 
the same hig h source. Unde r o ur system, thi s extreme power resides o nl y in 
Cong ress."); id. at 364- 65 ("Th is selection of Rock Island fo r milita ry pur-
poses was not, as we have seen, the unauthorized act of the President; but was 
made in the exerci se o f a di scretion vested in him by Cong ress." (Because] 
the power to di spose of the public lands ... be lo ngs to Congress, and not to 
the President ... the reservation o f Rock Island fo r milita ry purposes deri ves 
its va lidity . . . primari ly from the statute which authorized that se lection."); 
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id. ("[l]nstead of designating the place themselves, [Congress] left it to the 
discretion o/ 1he Presidenl, which is precisely 1he same 1hing in effect." ); see 
also 21 Op. Att 'y Gen . 120, 121 (1895); 17 Op. Att 'y Gen. 168 (1881); 16 Op. 
Att 'y Gen. 121, 123 (1878). 
120 See MAYER, supra note 71, at 35; see also Jenkin s v. Collard , 145 U.S. 546, 
560- 61 (189 11 892) (when a President issues a proclamation on matters e ither 
wi thin the Pres ident's inherent powers or to execute a de legated authorit y, the 
proclamation has the fo rce of law); I ndep. Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 
F.2d 228, 234 (8th Cir. 1975); see also Gnotta v. Unites States , 41 5 F.2d 127 1, 
1275 (8th Cir. 1969). 
121 MAYER, supra note 71, at 35- 36; see also Marks v. Cent. In telligence 
Agency, 590 F.2d 997, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (not ing tha t an execut ive order 
cannot supersede a statute). 
122 See generally Yoo & GANZIANO, supra note 33 (prov idi ng their mai n 
critiques of the AG opinion as:( !) it s reliance on trust law to sugges t that a 
great of power to create something mu st include the power to aboli sh it ; (2) it s 
read ing of the or iginal purposes of the Antiqu iti es Act; and (3) genera l lack of 
support and depth of ana lysis fo r its conclusion that the Pres ident is without 
authorit y to revoke the Castl e Pinckney ationa l Monument). 
123 The cha llengers in the OCS LA action cite the Attorney General opinion 
as persua ive authori ty fo r a strict read ing of the OCS LA text. See Memo-
randu m in Support o f Plaintiffs' Motion for ummary Judgment, League of 
Conserva tion Voters v. Donald Trump, 303 F. Supp. 3d 985 ( D. Alaska 201 8). 
The Court agreed those opinions are "persuas ive." See League of Conserva-
tion Voters v. Dona ld Trump, o. 3:17-cv-00101-SLG , 201 9 WL 1431217, 
* IO (D. Alaska , Mar. 29, 2019) (noting that "Congress has used the term s 
'w ithdrawa l' and ' reserva tion' interchangeably fo r many decades.") 
124 See Yoo & GANZIANO, supra note 33, at 5 (explaining that Attorney Gen-
era l opin ions are binding on executi ve branch agencies, but a president is free 
to disregard them - especia ll y ifhe concludes th at hi s oath to take ca re that 
the laws are fa ith fu lly executed conflicts with such an opinion.) 
125 Federa l Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U. S.C. § 1701(a)(4) 
(20 12) (" [l]t is the policy of the United States that Congress exercise its con-
stitutiona l to authority withdraw ... Federal lands for specific purposes and 
th at Congress may delineate the ex tent to wh ich the Executi ve may withd raw 
lands without legislat ive ac tion."). 
126 James R. Ra band, The Future o/1he Antiquities Act. 21 J. LAND 
RESOU RCES & ENVTL. L. 619, 625 (200 1). 
127 CoGGI s, supra note 20, at 340. 
128 John Yoo and Todd Ganziano, Opinion: Trump Can Reverse Obama 's 
Lasr Minute Land Grab, WALL ST. J. ( DEC. 30, 2016), https://www.wsj .com/ 
art icles/tru mp-ca n-reverse-obamas-last-m i nute-land-grab -1 483 142922 . 
129 Getches, supra note 20, at 279. 
130 See United States v. S. Pac. Tra nsp. Co. , 543 F.2d 676, 686 (9 th Cir. 1976) 
(" We recogni ze that even after 1975, the Pres ident or the Secretary of the 
In terior could still a lter the boundaries of, or even ext inguish complete ly, an 
executive order reservation in order to make way fo r a rail road."); id. at 690 
("[b]efore Congress pro hibited future changes in Indian reserva tions by exec-
uti ve order, it was common prac tice fo r the President to terminate or reduce 
in size executive order reservations without payment of compensation."); see 
also Rasband, supra note 126, at 626 (" It thus appears that if a withd rawal is 
accomplished by executive authority implied from congress ional sil ence, a 
court will be more willing to recognize implied authority in the executi ve to 
undo what it has already done."). 
131 Numerous exa mples appear in Indian Affairs: Laws and Trealies, a 
seven-volume compilation of U.S. treaties, laws and executive orde rs pertain -
ing lo Nat ive America n Indian tribes compiled by Charl es J. Kapp ler in the 
ea rl y twentieth Cent ury and fi rst publi shed in 1903- 1904 by the Government 
Printing Office. See, e.g., CHARLES J. KAPPLER, I INDI AN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND 
TREATIES 467, 740 (Government Printing Office 1904); CHARLES J. KAPPLER, 3 
INDI AN AFFAIRS: LAWS AN D TREATI ES 694 (Government Printing Offi ce 1913); 
CHARLE J. KAPPLER, 7 INDIAN A FFAIRS: LAWS AN D TREATIES 1463, 1505 (Gov-
ernment Printing Office 1971). Oklahoma State University has digiti zed the 
work, li brary.okstate.edu/kappler/index .htm. The language used to revoke a 
reservation is someti mes, litera lly, " hereby revoke," and other times action to 
"restore to the public domain" lands prev iously reserved. See WM . H. Taft, 
Exec. Order No. 522 (Apri l 24, 1912) (" it is hereby ordered that Executi ve 
order da ted August 25, 1877, setting aside certain described land in the State 
of Ca lifornia for Ind ian purposes, be, and the sa me hereby is, revoked in so 
fa r as it re lates to the south half of section 20, tow nship 3 south of range I 
east of the Sa n Berna rdi no meridian ."); see also WM . H. Taft , Exec. Order 
Spring 2019 
o. 1224 (July 7, 19 10) (" It is hereby ordered tbat Executive orders of August 
25, 1877, March 9, 188 1, and December 29, 189 1, reserving certa in described 
lands in the State of Cali fornia for Indian purposes be, and the same are 
hereby, modi fied and amended in so fa r as to restore to the public domain fo r 
the purpose of settlement and entry the tracts described as fo llows . . . "). 
132 See 7 l DIAN AFFA IRS, supra note 131 ( tating the opinion of Attorney 
Genera l Harlan F. Stone, " Whether the Pres ident might lega lly aboli sh, in 
whole or in pa rt, Indi an reservations once created by him , has been se riously 
questioned (c itat ion omitted) and not with out strong reason; for the Indi an 
rights attach when the lands are thus set as ide; and moreover, the lands 
then at once become subject to a llotment under the genera l a llotment act. 
eve rtheless , the Pres ident has in fac t, and in a number of instances, changed 
the bounda ries of Execut ive orde r Indian reserva tions by excludi ng lands 
therefrom, and the question of his authority to do so has not appa rent ly come 
before the courts . . . . When by an Exec uti ve order public lands are set as ide, 
ei ther as a new Indian reservation or an addition to an old one, without furth er 
language ind icating that the action is a mere temporary ex pedient , such lands 
are therea fter properl y known and designated as an Indian reservation; and 
so long, at least, as the order continues in fo rce the Indians have the right of 
occupancy and use, and the United States has the title in fee."). 
133 Getches, supra note 20, at 285. 
134 Id. at 280. 
135 236 U.S. 459 (1915). 
136 Id. at 469; see also Getches, supra note 20, at 290- 92. 
137 See Chri stine A. Klein , Preserving Monumental Landscap es under the 
Antiquities Act, 87 COR NELL L. REV. 1333, 1355- 63 (2002) (elaborat ing when 
pres identia l authority is strengthened by congress ional acquiescence). 
138 Pamela Baldwin , AUTHORITY OF A PRES IDENT TO MODIFY OR ELIMI NATE A 
ATIONAL Mo UM ENT 2 (2000). 
l39 ationa l Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, § 9, 90 
Stat. 2949 (1976) ("Notwith standing the provision s of the Act of June 4, 1897. 
. .. no land now or he rea fter reserved or wi thdrawn from the public domain as 
nationa l fores ts pursuant to the Act of March 3, 189 1 ... or any act supp lemen-
tary to and amendatory thereof, shall be returned to the public domain except 
by an act of Cong ress. ") (emphasis added) . 
14° Federa l Land Policy and Ma nagement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 170 1- 1782 (20 12). 
141 PUBLI C LAN D LAW REV IEW COM M'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND: A 
REPORT TO TH E PRESIDENT AND THE CONG RESS 54- 57 (1970). 
142 Pub. L. No. 94- 579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2743 (1976) (citing U. S. v. Midwesr 
Oil Co. in repealing the implied executi ve authority) . 
143 PUB LI C LAN D LAW REVIEW COMM 'N, supra note 14 1, 54- 55. 
144 i d. at 55. 
145 See BALDWI N, supra note 138, at 2. 
146 Federa l Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U. S.C. § 1702(e) (20 12). 
147 The Forest Service Orga nic Act of 1897, ch. 2, § I, 30 Stat. 11 , 36 (repealed 
1905) (asserting that " to remove any doubt which may exist pertaining to the 
authority of the President thereun to, the Pres ident of the Uni ted States is hereby 
authori zed and empowered to revoke, modify, or suspend any and a ll such Execu-
tive orders and proclamations, or any part thereof, from time to time as he shall 
deem best fo r the public interests" and that " [t]he Pres ident is hereby authori zed at 
any time to modify any Executive order that has been or may hereafter be made 
establishing any forest reserve, and by such modification may reduce the area or 
change the boundary li nes of such reserve, or may vacate altogether any order 
creating such reserve"). See generally Robert Bassman, The 1897 Organic Act: A 
Historical Perspective, 7 AT. RES. L. 503, 510 (1974) (prov iding a rich backstory 
to the inclusion of the revoca tion provision). Basically, this legislation was the 
culmination of years of cont roversy surro unding the withdrawa l of considerable 
tracts of federal land fo r forest reserves, starti ng with the Act of March 3, 189 1. 
Id. President Cleveland had issued 13 proclamations establi shing forest reserves 
in 7 states, which outraged Western publ ic offic ials. An ea rlier appropriations bill 
in 1897 including a proposal to abolish the reservations and an amendment to give 
the Pres ident authority to abolish any and all reserves. The Western members 
were opposed to rely ing on the President to abolish the reserves himself cla iming 
that they could not trust the President to revoke his own orders. The fi nal compro-
mise did not specifica lly aboli sh President Cleveland 's earlier withdrawa ls, but 
instead gave him the authority to do so. Id. 
148 The Forest Service Organic Ac t of 1897, ch. 2, § I, 30 Stal. 11 , 36 
(re pea led 1905). 
149 16 U.S.C. § 473 (2012). 
150 Desert Land Act, 43 U.S.C. § 641 ("The Secretary of the In terior may, in his 
discret ion, continue sa id segrega tion fo r a period not exceed ing fi ve yea rs, or 
29 
may, in hi s di scre tion, resto re such lands not irrigated and recla imed to the public 
doma in upon the expiration o f the ten-year period o r of any extension the reof."). 
151 19 10 Pic ke tt Act, ch. 42 1, 36 Sta t. 847 (19 10) (repea led 1976) (expressly 
a utho ri zed the revocation o r vacating of executi ve orde rs or proc la mations 
c reating fo rest reserves under the Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Sta t. 1103). 
152 See R as ba nd , supra no te 121, a t 627 (affi rm ing an establi shed canon of 
s ta tuto ry inte rpre tation th a t the court shou ld avo id reading a statute in a way 
that wou Id rende r statuto ry language superfluous) . 
153 43 U.S.C. § 1701 ("A ll w ithdrawa ls, rese rva tions, c lass ification s, a nd 
des igna tions in effect as of the date of approva l of thi s Act sha ll re ma in in 
full fo rce a nd e ffect until modified unde r the prov isions o f thi s Act o r othe r 
applicable law."). 
154 43 u.s.c. § 17 14. 
155 Id. . 
156 Ge tches, supra note 20, at 316-1 7 (describing that the revocations were not 
made according to the prescribed procedures fo r referra l of the Secre tary 's 
recomme ndations fo r continuation o r termi nation of w ithdrawa ls). 
157 43 u.s.c. § I 7 14(j ). 
158 H.R. Re p. 94-11 63 at 9 ( 1976) (" With certa in exceptions, H.R . 13777 will 
repea l a ll ex is ting law re la ting to executi ve autho rity to c reate, modify, and 
te rmin a te w ithdrawal s and reservatio ns. It would reserve to the Cong ress the 
autho rity to c reate, modify, a nd termin ate w ithdrawals for nationa l pa rks, 
na tiona l fores ts, the Wilderness Syste m , Indian rese rva tions, ce rta in defense 
w ithdrawa ls ... . It would a lso specifica ll y reserve to the Congress the 
autho ri ty to modify a nd revoke withdrawals fo r nationa l monume nts c reated 
under the A ntiquities Act .... These prov isions will in sure that the integrity 
o f the g reat nat iona l resource management system s will rema in under the 
control o f the Cong ress." ). 
159 See 39 U.S. O p. Atty. Gen 186 (c it ing 10 U.S. O p. Atty. Gen. 359 ( 1862)). 
160 See ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 37 (c iting Bledsoe v. Pa lm Beach Cty. 
Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 822 ( I Ith C ir. 1998)) (address-
ing leg is la ti ve action a fte r a n ea rlie r legal inte rpre tation by the Atto rney 
Genera l); see also United S tates v. Estate of Roma ni , 523 U.S . 517, 530 -31 
( 1998) (sta ting tha t late r congressiona l actions need not a mend the ea rli er 
statute in o rde r for ra tified principles of law to govern , pa rti cu larl y when the 
la te r sta tute comprehensive ly addresses a subject). 
16 1 See BALDWIN, supra note 133, at 4-5 ("The FLPMA language addresses only 
actions of the Secreta ry, while the Antiquities Act is worded in terms o f actions 
the President may take . . . . However, it appears fro m the breadth of the commi t-
tee repo rt lang uage that Congress may have believed that controlling revocations 
by the Secreta ry in thi s regard would o perate to control the revocation o f national 
monument withdrawals - i.e . to control the actions o f the Pres ident."). 
l62 H.R. 2284, I 15th Cong. (2017). 
163 For in sta nce, the I 14th Congress conside red proposa ls to subject monu-
me nt des igna tions to Cong ress ional a nd state approva l, prohibit the Pres ident 
from es tab lishing o r expanding nat iona l monuments in pa rticu lar locations, 
and ma ke the Pres ident's authority subj ect to NEPA or impose othe r require-
ments fo r consultation. See VINCENT, supra note 27, at 11-1 2 . Rece nt pro posa ls 
in the I 15th Cong ress are s imilar. See Improved National Monument Designa-
tion Process Act, S. 33, 115th Cong. (20 17) ( " Before a national monument can 
be designated on public land, the Pres ident must obta in congress ional 
approva l, ce rtify compliance w ith the National Environmenta l Po licy Act of 
1969 ( EPA), and receive not ice from the governor of the state in which the 
monu ment is to be located that the state leg is lature has enacted leg islation 
approving its des ignation."). 
164 54 U.S.C. § 32030 1(a) (20 12). 
165 Debra Holtz et al., National landmarks al Risk: How Rising Seas, Floods, 
and Wildfires are Threatening the United States ' Most Cherished Historic Sites, 
U NION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (2014) http://www.ucsusa.org/g lobal_wa rming/ 
science_ and_ impacts/i m pacts/nationa I-land marks-at-ri sk- from-cl imate-
change.htm I? _ga= l .143705777.562670586. 14934 13292#.WQ vAARSR LBI. 
166 See sup ra Part I l( B). 
l67 Northe rn Ber ing Sea C limate Res ilience, supra note 64. 
168 Id. 
169 A 1913 memorandum summari z ing Cong ress iona l and j udicia l pro-
no uncements on the Execu ti ve w ithdrawa l authority confi rms a one-way 
pe rspective: " the Pres ident in the exerc ise of hi s executi ve powers stands in a 
pos ition to protect and adminis ter the public doma in until Congress ca n ac t." 
3 INDI AN A FFAIRS, supra note 131, at 693. 
17° Congress debated a bill to des ig nate as w ilderness 1. 8 million ac res 
owned by the federa l government in Uta h. The pro posa l cleared Ho use and 
Senate committees but was not enacted . See Justin James Q uigley, Grand 
Staircase Escalante National Monument: Preservation or Politics, 19 J. 
OF LAND, R ES., & ENVTL. L. 55, 69-7 .1 (.1 999). Pres ident Clinton then issued 
Proclamation 6920 to establish the G rand Sta ircase-Esca lante National 
Monument, setti ng as ide approx imately 1.7 m ill ion acres under the A ntiq ui-
t ies Act. 6 1 Fed. Reg. 50223, 50225 (Sept. 4, 1996). In response, leg islat ion 
was in troduced to prov ide that fo r any nationa l monument in excess o f 5,000 
ac res, the Pres ident wo uld need an act o f Congress and the concurrence o f 
the governor and the state leg is lature. T he Ho use passed the legislat ion, but 
the Senate did not. See LOUIS FISHER, EXECUTIVE O RDERS AND PROCLAMATIONS, 
1933-99: CONTROV ERSIES WITH CONGRESS AN D THE COURTS 18-1 9 (1999). 
17 1 Fi sher, supra note 70, at 106 ("Congress can reta liate aga inst executi ve 
o rde rs and proc la mat ions it fi nd s objectionable, but mov in g remedia l leg isla-
t ion th ro ugh both chambers can be an uphill struggle." ). 
172 Jonathan Thompson, Bears Ears a Go - But Here 's Where Obama Drew 
the Line: The Designation 's Concessions are Unlikely to Appease Ardent 
Opponents, HIG H COUNTRY NEWS ( DEC. 29, 201 6), https://www.hcn.o rg/ 
a rtic les/oba ma-des ignates-bea rs-ea rs-na tional-monument . 
173 See 5-year Timeline a/Tribal Engagement to Protect Bears Ears, BEARS 
EARS INTER-TRIBAL COALITION, https://bearsea rscoalit ion.org/timeline/ (last 
visited March 28, 2019). 
174 Proposal to President Barack Obama for the Creation of Bears Ears 
National Monument, BEARS EARS INTER-TRIBAL COA LITION (OCT. IS, 20 15) 
h ttps ://be a rsearscoa Ii t ion .org/w p-con ten t/uploads/201 5/ I O/ Bears-Ears-1 nte r-
Tri ba 1-Coa 1ition-Proposal- 10-15- 15.pd f. 
175 See Ray Ras ker, Wes t Is Bes t: How Public lands in the West Cre-
ate a Competitive Economic Advantage, HEADWATERS ECONOMICS 
( D EC. 2012) https://headwa terseconom ics.org/econom ic-development/ 
trends-per fo rma nce/west-is-best-va I ue-of-pu bl ic-la nds/. 
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See Jam v. lnt ' I Fin. Corp., 139 S. Ct. 759, 767 (20 19) (referencing Inte rnationa l 
Finance Corpo rat ion's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jur isdiction). 
2 id. 
Id. at 77 1. 
See generally 22 LJ.S.C. § 288 (1945) (codi fy ing the Inte rnationa l O rga-
ni zat ions Immunities Act); 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (20 16) (codi fy ing the Fore ign 
Sovere ig n Immuni t ies Act); Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 772 (interpre ting the IOI A to 
a l low fo r the modern immunities of fo re ign sovere igns unde r FS I A). 
5 Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 766. 
Id. a t 768 (quo ting 22 LJ.S.C. § 288a(b)). 
Id. a t 765 -66. 
Id. 
id. a t 766. 




13 Id. (outlining D.C. District Court Judge Pillard 's di ssent and the c ircuit 
sp lit between the D.C. and Third Circuits in 20 10). 
14 i d. at 772 . 
15 Id at 766 (emphas is added) (c iting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2 01 6)). 
16 See generally O BB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 136 S. Ct. 390 (20 15) 
(declining to rev iew novel argument presented by pe titione rs about substan-
ti a l contacts with U.S. e lement); Saudi A rabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 358-59, 
377-78 (1993) (i ncluding numerous dissents and not rev iewi ng substantia l 
contacts w ith U.S. e leme nt because the Court did not find com mercia l 
acti v ity); Republic of A rgentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 611 (1992) 
(reviewing onl y one of three scenarios that could establ ish commercia l act iv-
ity with substanti a l contacts to U.S.). 
17 See Jam, 139 S. Ct. at 77 1. 
18 Id at 772. 
19 Id (emphasis added). 
20 id (emphasis added). 
21 See id. 
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not violate state jurisdiction merely because it substantiall y affects intrastate 
electricity markets under state jurisdiction and emphas izing the importance 
of the target at whi ch the regulation ai ms); Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. 
v. Public Serv. Comm 'n, 754 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Ci r. 1985) (holding that merely 
considering or incorporating wholesa le prices in rate -setting for a state-
regulated acti vity does not intrude on federa l authorit y). 
21 Compare Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1297-98 (rejecting Maryland 's subsidy 
program because it requires subsidy recipients to se ll electricity through PJM 's 
capaci ty auction and guarantees subsidy rec ipients an electricity price distinct 
from PJM 's market clearing price) with Elec. Power Supply Ass'n v. Star, 904 
F.3d 518, 524-25 (7th Cir. 2018) (permitting Illinois' nuclear energy subsidy 
because it does not condition payment on recipients clearing the RTO capac ity 
auction nor regulates the rate or transac tion terms of wholesa le power). 
22 See generally Elec. Power Supply Ass 'n, 136 S. Ct. at 782 (defin ing the 
scope of j udicial review ofFE RC agency rulemak ing under the arbitra ry and 
capricious standard as determining whether the agency reviewed all sa lient 
considerat ions and arti culated a rational explanation con necting facts fo und 
with the choice made). 
23 Id. at 769. 
24 Ca lpine Corp. v. PJM Interconnection , LLC, 163 F.E.R.C. iJ 61,236, 20 18 
W L 3360507, at * 16 (20 18). 
25 See Subsidy Short List, PJM Capacity Construct/Public Policy Senior Task 
Force Meeting, (June 5, 2017), http://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-
grou ps/task-forces/ccppst f/2 01 70605/20 170605- i tem-02-su bsidy-short-1 i st-
20 17053 1.ash x ( li sting over 100 subsidy programs in PJM states significantly 
reducing the cost of natural gas and coa l production, and the reby suppress ing 
capacity bids, including West Virginia tax benefits for coal, Penn sylvania 
gross receipt tax exemption on natu ra l gas utility sa les, and Penn sylvani a 
sa les and use tax exemption fo r coal purchases). 
26 From 2013-20 14 a lone, federal and state support for foss il-fue l based e lec-
tricity generation exceeded $8.5 billion annua ll y. See lvetta Gerasimchuck et 
al., Zombie Energy: Climate benefi ts of ending subsidies to foss il f uel produc-
tion, INT' L INST. FOR SUSTA INA BLE DEVELOPM ENT, viii (2017), https://www.iisd. 
org/s ites/defa u lt/ fi les/pu bl ica t ions/zombie-energy-climate-benefi ts-ending-
subsid ies-foss i I-fuel-p rod uct ion. pd f. 
27 See Calpine Corp., 163 F.E. R.C. at *51 (Glick, C. dissenting) (noting that , 
by mitiga ting low-emissions electri ci ty subsidies, FERC allows GENCOs 
to foc us only on private generation costs and di sregard the ex te rn al soc ieta l 
costs of foss il fue l-based electric ity). 
28 Sylwia Bialek & Burci n nel, Capacity Markets and Externalities: Avoid-
ing Unnecessary and Problematic Reforms , INST. FOR POLICY INTEG RITY at 
12 (2018) (explaining that climate change damages associated with a typica l 
1,000 MW coa l plant exceed $230 million ann ually). 
29 See EPA , Energy and Environment Guide to Action: Renewable Portfo li o 
Standards 5-2 (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/ fi les/2017-06/ 
documents/guide _action_ f u I I.pd f. 
30 See Coa l. for Compet iti ve Elec. Dynegy Inc., v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 
3d 554, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 20 17) (permitti ng New York 's nuclear energy subsidy 
because GE CO recipients receive credits for renewable ene rgy's environ-
menta l attributes which are bought and sold separately fro m RTO markets). 
ENDNOTES : D OES l M PORTI G ENDANGERED S PECIES' B ODY P ARTS H ELP C ONSERVAT ION? DI SCRETIO TO I MPORT 
T ROPlll ES U NDER T HE TR UMP ADMINISTRATION 
continued.from page 23 
See North and South, The (Global) , INTERNATIONA L ENCYCLOPEDI A OF THE 
SOCIAL Sc i ENC ES, https://www.encycloped ia.com/soc ial-sciences/appl ied-
a nd-soc ia I- sc iences-magazi nes/north-and-south-globa I (explaining Eu rope, 
Ca nada , the United States, Australia, New Zea land , and Japan are examples 
of the Globa l North , as they have been developed fo r many yea rs). 
5 See DIANA MITLI N & DAVID SATTERTHWAITE, URBAN POV ERTY IN TH E GLOB. 
Sourn: SCA LE AND ATURE 13 (20 13) (defining the Global South as all coun-
tries class ified as low- and midd le- income by the World Bank in Afr ica, Asia , 
Latin America, and the Caribbean, as compared to the more prosperous and 
developed Globa l North). 
6 Myanna Dellinger, Trophy Hunting Contracts: Unenforceable/or Rea-
sons of Public Policy, 41 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 396 (2016). See generally 
16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (20 12) (defining spec ies as any subsection of wi ldlife or 
fi sh and "a ny di stinct popu lation segment of any spec ies of ve rtebrate fi sh or 
wi ldli fe" th at interbreeds at the age of maturity). 
7 See § 1532(3) (defi ning conserving as all methods necessa ry to get 
endangered and threa tened species to the point which the measures to protect 
them are no longer necessary. These methods include habitat maintenance, 
tran spl antation, and li ve trapping. Regulated taking is only allowed in 
ex traordinary cases where population pressures ca nnot be otherwise relieved). 
8 About the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. F1s1-1 & WI LDLI FE SERV. (last 
updated May 31, 20 18), https://www.fws.gov/help/abo ut_us. html. 
9 Id. 
IO See § 153 1(a)( l)- (3) (stating that economic growth and deve lopment without 
adequate concern and conservation have caused species to become ex tinct); see 
also H.R. Rep. o. 97-567, at 9 (1982) (ex plaining that prev ious efforts included 
the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966 and the Endangered Species 
Conservation Act of 1969); see also Endangered Species Act, U.S. F1 sH AND 
W1 LDL1 FE SERv., https://www.fws.gov/endangered/ laws-po l icies. 
11 Endangered Species Act, U.S. FISH AND WI LDLIFE SERv. ENDA GE RED 
SPEC IES , https://www.fws.gov/endangered/ laws-po l icies (last vis ited Mar. I 0, 
20 19) (summarizing the ESA and its history). 
12 Tenn . Valley Auth . v. Hill , 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978) (stating that the ESA 
requires that federa l agencies do not act in a way that wi ll jeopa rdi ze the ex is-
tence of an endangered species and that under the ESA, Congress intended that 
the protect ion of endangered specie would be given the "highest of priorities"). 
13 See§ 1533 (a)( l) (lay ing out that a species is considered endangered or 
threa tened depending on: "( I) [t]here is the present or threatened destruction , 
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mod ificat ion, or curtai lment of its hab itat or range ... (2) overutili zation for 
com mercia l, recreational, sc ientific, or educa tional purposes (3) disease or 
predation (4) the inadeq uacy of ex isting regulatory mechanisms [or] (5) .. 
other natural or man made factors affecting its continued ex istence"); see also 
Safari Club Int ' ! v. Jewell , 960 F. Supp. 2d 17, 27- 28 (D.D.C. 20 13) (q uoti ng 
M. Lynne Corn el al., Cong. Research Serv., RL31654, The Endangered 
Species Act: A Primer, at S (2012)) (ex pla ining that the ESA is considered suc-
cessfu l when it helps stabi I ize or increase the populations of I isted spec ies). 
14 § 153 1(b) (establi shing the purpose of the ESA as "a mea ns whereby 
the ecosystems upon wh ich endangered spec ies and threa tened species 
depend may be conserved, to provide a program for the conservation of such 
endangered spec ies and threatened spec ies"). 
15 See§ 1538(a)( l) (definin g " take" to inc lude harm , harass, pursue, hunt, 
shoot, wound, ki II , trap, capture, or co llect) . 
16 § 1532(8) (expa nding the definition of " fi sh or wild li fe" to dead anim als) . 
17 §§ 1539(a)( l)(A)- ( B) (empowering the Service to permit a taking of an 
endangered or threatened animal ). 
18 Id. (enumerat ing the reasons fo r which the Serv ice can g ive a pe rmit). 
19 Id. 
20 5 .S.C. § 706(2)(A) (stating that a rev iew ing court sha ll ho ld unlaw ful 
any agency action that is arbit rary, ca pric ious, or otherwise unl awfu l). 
21 See infra Part 11. 
22 Id. 
23 See infra Pa rt ll I. 
24 See infra Part IV. 
25 See infra Part V. 
26 About !he U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, supra note 8. 
21 Id. 
28 id. 
29 Id.; see also About Us, U.S. F1sH & WILDLI FE SERv., https://www.fws.gov/ 
international /about-us/ (last visited Februa ry 24, 20 19) (showi ng how the 
Service 's Internationa l Affa irs progra m helps with international conservat ion 
by administe ring grant programs that support human and institutiona l ca pac-
ity building and research , providing techni ca l ass istance lo w ildli fe managers 
worldwide, regulating international trade, and regulating species ex ported 
from the United States). 
30 See generally International Affairs, U.S. F1sH & WILDLI FE SERv., https:// 
www.fws.gov/internationa l/ (last vis ited Feb. 24, 2019). 
31 
31 See generally Permits, U.S. F1 sH & WI LDLIFE SERv. , https://www.fws.gov/ 
international /permits/ ( last visited Feb. 24, 2019). 
32 See generally International Affairs Program Strategic Framework 
(20i4-2019), U.S. F1sH & WILDLIFE SERv. (A ug. 20 14), https://www.fws.gov/ 
international /strategic-plan.pdf; see also Treaties and Conventions, .S. 
F1sH & WI LDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/i nte rnational/laws-t reaties-
ag reements/treaties-a nd-conventions/ (last vis ited Feb. 24, 2019) (stating that 
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